sBOLD vault drained via flash loan
Blockaid reported that attackers took approximately $3.43 million from the sBOLD vault through roughly 34 transactions, a figure that reflects losses recorded as of the security firm’s 12:50 UTC alert on Wednesday. K3 Capital responded on X at 13:08 UTC, roughly 17 minutes after the alert, to say they were investigating "malicious activity involving sBOLD" and that contracts have been paused. One transaction flagged by Blockaid occurred on Ethereum at 12:25 UTC and contained 231 separate token transfers. The sBOLD vault functions as a yield product running on the Liquity V2 lending protocol. Users deposit BOLD, the dollar-pegged stablecoin from Liquity V2, into the vault, which then places those assets in Liquity stability pools. These pools hold BOLD reserves to pay off debt from liquidated loans and receive those loans’ collateral in exchange. Liquity describes sBOLD as a third-party project from K3 Capital rather than a part of its core protocol. This vault follows the ERC-4626 Ethereum standard and includes adjustable components, such as the adapter it uses to swap tokens. The attack targeted the Liquity V2-based vault’s adjustable components, such as the price oracle. Blockaid’s alert on X at 12:50 UTC noted that the total loss may have grown since the 34 transactions were recorded.
Attack mechanics and audit results
The attackers used a flash loan in wstETH, which is the wrapped version of staked ether from Lido, to initiate the exploit. After liquidating their own Liquity V2 trove to send debt and collateral into stability pools, the attackers minted cheap sBOLD shares and swapped the collateral. They then redeemed BOLD that belonged to the vault’s other depositors. This specific attack path remains unconfirmed as K3 Capital continues to investigate the cause. The mitigation of self-liquidation risks promised in the May 19, 2025, ChainSecurity audit failed to prevent this exploit.
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Reported loss | $3.43 million |
| Transaction count | 34 |
| Audit date | May 19, 2025 |
| Audit firm | ChainSecurity |
A single transaction at 12:25 UTC occurred 25 minutes before the Blockaid alert. This vault uses an adapter to swap tokens. K3 Capital has not said what all depositors in the vault can expect regarding their BOLD assets or future compensation.
